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Indonesia’s low concern for labour issues 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - This study advances explanations of the communication level of labour 
disclosures of Indonesian listed companies.  
Design/methodology/approach - Year-ending 2007 Annual report disclosures of 223 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) listed companies are analyzed. The Labour Practices 
and Decent Work Disclosure component of the 2006 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
guidelines are used as the benchmark disclosure index checklist. 
Findings - The results show a low level of voluntary disclosure (17.7%). The highest 
level of communication is for issues related to Skills Management and Lifelong Learning 
Programs for Employees. Very few companies disclosed information about Health and 
Safety Committee and Agreements, and Salary of Men to Women. Statistical analysis 
reveals that government ownership and international operations are positively significant 
predictors of ‘labour’ communication. Isomorphic institutional theory partially explains 
the variability of these disclosures. Bigger companies also provide more Labour 
Practices and Decent Work Disclosures. 
Research limitations/implications - The main implications of the findings are that 
Indonesian companies are not clearly communicating labour responsibility issues as a 
key precondition of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). They may be obfuscating 
some information to protect their image and reputation.  
Originality/value - This paper provides insights into the disclosure practices of labour 
issues, a specific social disclosure theme which is rarely examined in prior literature, 
under the umbrella of institutional theory. The research also includes ‘goal factor’ to be 
tested as one of the independent variables.  
Keywords Social accounting, Developing country, Communication, Institutional theory, 
Global Reporting Initiative 
Paper type Research paper 
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Introduction 
There are now fundamental and far-reaching changes in regulations relating to social 
reporting practices in Indonesia. From 7 December 2006, under the Indonesian Securities 
Supervisory Agency (BAPEPAM)’s regulation[1], all listed companies are required to 
 
1 This regulation is then strengthened by Act No. 40/2007 which requires limited companies in and/or related to the area 
of natural resources, regardless of whether they are listed or not, to perform social and environmental responsibility 
activities (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2007). This act, which is effective from 16 August 2007, also requires all 
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report any social responsibility activities in their annual reports (see BAPEPAM, 2006). 
These changes signal attention by the Indonesian government in regards to corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities and reporting practices. However, Utama (2008) 
argues that there are still problems in relation to the implementation of the new 
regulations as specific social activities items are not clearly delineated in those 
regulations. This brings into question the seriousness of the government on CSR 
regulation (see Kotijah, 2008). Given the lack of specifics and clarity in the regulations, 
the reporting practices of specific CSR items effectively remain voluntary. Thus, the 
extent of CSR reporting potentially varies across companies (Utama, 2008). This paper 
explores the actual level of disclosures by Indonesian companies.  
 
CSR reporting has emerged as a serious research area since the mid-1970s in the business 
and particularly accounting literature (Neu et al., 1998). Previous studies on social 
accounting generally examine social issues in a broad context by looking holistically at a 
set of labour, human right, community, product responsibility, and environmental 
information (e.g. Mirfazli, 2008). In the last two decades, however, interest in CSR 
accounting has been overtaken by more specific focus on a subset of CSR reporting, 
namely environmental disclosure. According to Mathews (1997), the key factor driving 
such concern is the recognition that past and current financial accounting and disclosure 
mechanisms have failed to include issues which now threaten our planet. 
 
More recently, there is also an observable trend in a growing number of studies focusing 
on another subset of CSR reporting, which is disclosure of companies’ interaction with 
their workers (e.g. Vuontisjärvi, 2006; Brown et al., 2005), but there remains a literature 
gap in research on employees.  According to Vuontisjärvi (2006), employees are critical 
components of CSR and therefore studies in this area are valuable. Johnston (2001) states 
that if a company does not perform high levels of CSR for its own employees it will not 
be able to pursue CSR activities for its outside environment (for example customers and 
local community). Given that CSR reporting is not clearly detailed in Indonesia, it is 
 
limited companies (not only companies dealing with natural resources) to disclose social and environmental activities 
in their annual reports (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2007). 
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considered important to specifically examine the level of listed companies’ CSR 
disclosures on labour issues[2] in this developing nation[3]. Labour related Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) social indicators are adopted as the disclosure index checklist 
for Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosures examined in this study. Labour 
Practices and Decent Work Disclosures[4] encompass five main labour issues, which are 
Employment, Labor/Management Relations, Occupational Health and Safety, Training 
and Education, and Diversity and Equal Opportunity. 
 
This paper is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it provides insights into the 
disclosure practices on labour issues, a specific social disclosure theme. Secondly, it 
applies institutional theory, a relatively newer approach for explaining social disclosure 
practices (see Islam and Deegan, 2008). The use of this theory is potentially helpful and 
provides greater insights of Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosure practices since 
theories previously used in CSR accounting literature such as stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory failed to fully explain the CSR reporting phenomenon (Milne and 
Patten, 2002; Deegan, 2009). Thirdly, it includes ‘goal factor’, a variable which is not 
commonly examined in previous disclosure studies, to be tested as one of the independent 
variables explaining labour disclosure practices. Finally, this study uses the latest 2006 
version of GRI as the disclosure index checklist. This best represents the most 
internationally current stakeholder concerns on labour issues. 
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
Studies on CSR reporting, including those examining disclosures of labour issues, have 
adopted a variety of theories such as stakeholder theory (e.g. Cahaya et al., 2006) and  
legitimacy theory (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). More recently, researchers have 
 
2
In this nation, there is a distinctive gap in the power relationship between companies and their workers (see ILF, 
2008). This dichotomy places workers in a far weaker position vis a vis the companies (ILF, 2008). Such disharmony 
highlights the need to investigate how Indonesian companies are socially responsible to their workers and how they 
then disclose information about this social responsibility. 
3
 In addition to the issues of CSR related regulations, Indonesia's complex labour social problems are also of critical 
importance to many global multilateral organizations. This is evidenced by some studies undertaken by organizations 
like the World Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO) on women workers’ overtime compensation and 
child labour in Indonesia (see Pangestu and Hendytio, 1997; IDP, 2006). This further emphasizes the importance of 
choosing Indonesia as the country of study. 
4 LPDWD and labour disclosure practices are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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employed institutional theory[5] (e.g. Amran and Siti-Nabiha, 2009). CSR accounting 
scholars (e.g. Milne and Patten, 2002; Amran and Devi, 2008; Deegan, 2009) now 
recommend focusing on this theory as it potentially provides greater insights of CSR 
reporting practices. Accordingly, this study adopts institutional theory as the underlying 
theoretical framework explaining labour disclosure practices in Indonesia. 
 
Institutional theory is a branch of legitimacy theory which explains that organizations are 
faced with institutional pressures, and due to these pressures, organizations tend to 
become similar in their forms and practices (Perera, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008; 
Deegan, 2009). Institutional theory itself has two main dimensions: isomorphism and 
decoupling[6].(Deegan, 2009). In the context of this study, isomorphism can be seen as 
the process by which labour disclosure by an organization is influenced by institutional 
pressures (see Dillard et al. 2004) while decoupling is a situation in which labour 
disclosure is used by an organization to create an image which is different from that 
organization’s actual activities, programs, and policies with its workers (see Deegan, 
2009). 
 
Results of past studies suggest that Indonesian companies communicate information 
about their CSR activities when they actually perform those activities and, in contrast, do 
not disclose CSR information when they do not have favourable CSR activities 
(Basalamah and Jermias, 2005). In Cahaya et al. (2006), for instance, it is suggested that 
Indonesian companies did not disclose some social issues such as anti-corruption 
programs because the management of the companies might be involved in corrupt 
activities. The focus of this study is exclusively on the process of organizations in 
undertaking labour disclosure practices, not on the relationship between companies’ 
 
5 As stated by Deegan (2009), institutional theory has actually been developed within the management literature since 
the late 1970s (see for example Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and adopted in the accounting literature, but not specifically 
in the CSR reporting literature, since 1988 (see for example Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988).   
6 One could argue that institutional theory has more than two dimensions. However, what is explicitly apparent from 
the literature is that there are only two main dimensions, which are isomorphism and decoupling (see Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Dillard et al., 2004; Rodrigues and Craig, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008; 
Deegan, 2009). Moreover, it is stated by Rodrigues and Craig (2007) and Islam and Deegan (2008) that the key element 
of institutional theory is isomorphism. Accordingly, this study focuses the discussion on the two dimensions of  
isomorphism and decoupling, with a particular emphasis on the former one as it is adopted as the underlying theoretical 
framework of the study. 
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labour disclosure practices and their actual performance. As such, this study adopts the 
isomorphic institutional dimension as the underlying theoretical framework. 
 
As detailed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), isomorphism consists of three processes: 
coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism[7] (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism refers to a situation in which organizations 
undertake institutional practices (e.g. labour disclosure practices) due to pressures from 
influential stakeholders (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Mimetic isomorphism refers to a 
situation in which organizations copy institutional practices of other organizations, often 
for competitive advantage reasons in terms of legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Normative isomorphism refers to the pressures arising from group norms, such as 
managers to undertake particular institutional practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Deegan, 2009). In line with Amran and Devi (2007; 2008), this study examines labour 
disclosure practices by testing components of all three variants, as discussed in the 
following hypotheses development. 
 
In Indonesia, creditors are a powerful and influential stakeholder group as listed 
companies rely extensively on creditors’ funds (see Okuda and Take, 2005; Cahaya et al., 
2008). Under Indonesia’s Code of Good Corporate Governance, creditors are regarded as 
an important stakeholder group to whom companies must transparently provide 
information (Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance, 2006). Based on their powerful 
position, creditors are therefore able to press companies to perform certain actions 
including the level of communication of CSR information (see Naser et al., 2006). 
Several prior studies document the significant effect of leverage on social disclosure 
practices (e.g. Naser et al., 2006). More particularly, a study by Alvarez (2007) shows 
that leverage has a significantly positive impact on human resource disclosures. In line 
with coercive isomorphism variant, this positive impact implies creditors’ pressure on 
 
7 These variants are phrased or termed differently by Scott (1995) as regulative, cognitive, and normative structures 
respectively. The meaning of these structures is essentially the same as DiMaggio and Powell’s three isomorphic 
variants (see Larrinaga-Gonzales, 2007; Bebbington et al., 2009). In the literature, the three isomorphic variants are 
more popularly used and therefore this study does not adopt Scott’s terms (see more detail discussions on DiMaggio 
and Powell’s isomorphic institutional variants and Scott’s structurally institutional variants in Larrinaga- González 
(2007)). 
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companies to provide more labour information. To examine this possible pressure, this 
study hypothesizes that:  
 
H1 There is a positive association between the leverage and the extent of voluntary 
Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosures in the annual reports of IDX listed 
companies 
 
In Indonesia, privatized government-owned companies are significantly influenced by the 
government’s decisions due to government funding (Adnan and Nankervis, 2003). This 
condition places managers of these companies in a powerless position particularly to 
reject ‘memos’ from the government (Adnan and Nankervis, 2003). According to Amran 
and Devi (2008), this is where coercive isomorphism by the government comes into play. 
Given that the government now has regulations relating to CSR, and recently has also 
released programs specifically concerning the development of employee quality and 
productivity[8] (Depnakertrans, 2008), it can be argued that companies with government 
ownership are potentially pressured into disclosing more information on labour issues. 
The significant and generally positive relationship between government ownership and 
disclosure practices is well documented in the literature (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Firer 
and Williams, 2005). Accordingly, a directional hypothesis is tested: 
 
H2 There is a positive association between government ownership and the extent of 
voluntary Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosures in the annual reports 
of IDX listed companies 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) state that companies within a similar industry tend to model 
themselves on similar companies that are more successful in securing legitimacy due to 
the adoption of a particular practice. For example, companies in high profile industries[9] 
 
8 These employee development programs were released by the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration 
(see Depnakertrans, 2008). The programs include the development of work competence standard and certification 
systems for trained workers, establishments of competence-based training programs within companies, improvement of 
trainers’ professionalism, and improvement of training facilities. 
9 High profile industries have been defined by Roberts (1992, p. 605) as those “with consumer visibility, a high level of 
political risk, and concentrated, intense competition”. For the purpose of this study, the definition of high profile 
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(e.g. mining) may disclose more information on occupational safety issues as their 
workers have a greater risk of injury during operations than might companies in low 
profile industries (e.g. retail). The significant relationship between industry type 
(particularly high versus low profile) and disclosure practices has been noted in a number 
of studies (see for example Hackston and Milne, 1996). To test the mimetic isomorphism 
of industry type, this study therefore hypothesizes:  
 
H3 There is a positive association between high profile IDX listed companies and 
the extent of voluntary Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosures in the 
annual reports  
  
A company which also operates overseas competes with both domestic and overseas 
competitors. For these reasons, in terms of legitimacy and consistent with mimetic 
isomorphism tenets, the company will tend to follow successful competitors by copying 
particular practices. Such behaviour is more likely to occur when the regulatory 
environment is not certain, such as the current situation in Indonesia (see DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Amran and Devi (2007) argue that a multinational company will follow 
existing regulation and culture of particular practices in overseas locations. In other 
words, to compete and obtain legitimacy globally, an internationally operating IDX listed 
company will imitate a particular CSR practice commonly undertaken overseas such as 
SA8000[10] and disclose that application in its annual report. In an Indonesian context, 
copying overseas practices may result in a higher level of labour disclosure practices (see 
Cahaya et al., 2008). As such, this study hypothesizes:  
H4 There is a positive association between the presence of international operations, 
and the extent of voluntary Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosures in 
the annual reports of IDX listed companies. 
 
 
industries is made more specific with an emphasis on those having a high level of risk to workers, particularly risks of 
work related accident. The classification of IDX listed companies within high and low profile industries, is explained in 
Table I. 
10 SA8000 is a new management standard which has recently been applied by companies particularly in developed 
nations such as Japan concerning companies’ accountability to their workers (SA8000, Standar Manajemen Baru, 
2006). 
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Amran and Devi (2007) argue that normative isomorphism pressures may occur when a 
firm has a stated goal related to CSR as such a goal reflects the way the company should 
behave. This argument can be applied in the context of labour disclosure practices where 
a company has an explicit and clearly stated goal related to the sustainable value of its 
employees. The sustainable value of employees in this study reflects the importance of 
workers as a critical component within a company whose continuous performance and 
skill development determines the continuity and the future of the company’s operation. 
Managers may think that they should be socially responsible to their workers and 
accordingly disclose this responsibility in the annual report. This study thus predicts: 
 
H5 There is a positive association between an explicit and clearly stated goal factor 
related to the sustainable value of employees and the extent of voluntary Labour 
Practices and Decent Work Disclosures in the annual reports of IDX listed 
companies 
 
In the Indonesian corporate governance structure, commissioners, which is an equivalent 
term (and role) for non-executive directors[11], function as a check and balance 
mechanism to ensure that companies act in the best interest of shareholders and advising 
on the public presentation of the company’s activities and performance (see Tricker 1984, 
p. 171). Such functions arguably enable commissioners, particularly the independent 
ones, to exert pressure on firms to disclose CSR information (see Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005). In line with normative isomorphism and past studies (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005), it can thus be argued that companies with a greater composition of independent 
commissioners on the board will provide more labour disclosure practices. As such, a 
directional hypothesis is tested: 
 
H6 There is a positive association between the proportion of independent 
commissioners and the extent of voluntary Labour Practices and Decent Work 
Disclosures in the annual reports of IDX listed companies 
 
11 Under Act No. 40/2007, commissioners can be regarded equivalent to non-executive directors since they have the 
same responsibility as the supervisors and the advisors of executive directors (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2007; 
Setyadi et al., 2007). 
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This study examines company size, economic performance and age of business as control 
variables for the statistical analysis. Prior researchers suggest that these variables 
potentially influence the association between the independent and dependent variables in 
social disclosure studies and therefore they should be controlled (Cowen et al., 1987; 
Williams, 1999; Roberts, 1992). Bigger companies may disclose more social information 
because they interact with a greater number of stakeholders (Cahaya et al., 2008). It is 
also documented in Roberts (1992) that companies having satisfactory financial 
performance disclose more social information since they have sufficient financial support 
for doing so. Finally, more mature companies potentially disclose more social 
information as its history and reputation of involvement in CSR activities are entrenched 
(Roberts, 1992).   
 
Research methodology 
This study uses a quantitative positivist empirical research methodology to explain labour 
communication practices. A sample of 223 companies is selected from a population of 
383 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2007 financial year 
(IDX, 2008). The selection of the companies is based on the availability of their 2007 
annual reports in either the IDX website or the companies’ websites. Data for all 
variables are collected from these annual reports [12]. 
 
The dependent variable in this study, namely Labour Practices and Decent Work 
Disclosures is measured by a disclosure index. Disclosure indices can be classified into 
weighted or unweighted indices (see Cooke, 1991). In a weighted disclosure index, 
particular disclosure items are given a higher score (when those items are disclosed) than 
the other disclosure items based on the perceived importance of those particular items 
(Cooke, 1991). For instance, information about injury during work could be given a score 
of (2) when this item is disclosed whereas another disclosed item such as the ratio of 
 
12
 The use of annual reports as the source of data is considered suitable for a disclosure study in a developing nation 
because other communication mediums are less used by most firms (Baker and Naser, 2000). An annual report itself is 
an official media of communication that must be provided by listed companies in Indonesia (BAPEPAM, 2008) and it 
generates a wide range of summarized relevant information about a company’s performance (Coy et al., 2001). 
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basic salary of male and female employees could be given a score of (1). This is because 
injury cases could be considered as having a relatively more dangerous impact on 
employees than the impact of salary. 
 
In an unweighted index, each disclosure item is deemed equally important and therefore 
each item is awarded the same score when it is disclosed (Cooke, 1991; Meek et al., 
1995). This disclosure index type is the one most often used in past disclosure studies 
(see for example Cooke, 1991; Hossain et al., 1995; Cahaya et al., 2008; Lim et al., 
2007). An unweighted technique is considered to be far less subjective than a weighted 
technique and is more relevant to all companies (Chang et al., 1983; Cooke, 1991; Craig 
and Diga, 1998; Chavent et al., 2006; Abhayawansa and Abeysekera, 2009). It is 
therefore acknowledged in the literature that the unweighted approach has become the 
norm in disclosure studies (see Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). To be consistent with the past 
literature, this study adopts an unweighted technique for scoring each disclosure item.   
 
To obtain the value of an unweighted index, the contents of each annual report are 
compared to the items listed on a checklist and coded as 1 or 0, depending upon whether 
or not the content conforms to the items listed on the checklist (Meek et al., 1995). 
Thirteen voluntary GRI Labour Practices and Decent Work indicators are used in this 
study as the disclosure index checklist (see the details of the items in Appendix). A 
disclosure index for each company is then calculated as the ratio of total score awarded to 
the company divided by the maximum number of items that are applicable for the entity. 
 
The main reason for adopting GRI performance indicators in this study is that they are 
the most widely accepted international reporting guidelines[13] which have a high 
international profile and focus primarily on the content of sustainability reporting (Fraser, 
2005; Adams, 2004). These indicators have been developed through a dialogue-based 
process with global stakeholders from business, the investor, community, labor, civil 
society, accounting, academia, and others (Global Reporting Initiative, 2006; 2010). 
 
13 Data from the GRI website reveals that there are now more than 1,000 organizations across the world using the GRI 
guidelines (see Global Reporting Initiative, 2010). 
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Importantly, GRI indicators under the category of Labour Practices and Decent Work 
were developed based on internationally recognized labour standards such as United 
Nations Conventions and International labour Organization (ILO) Conventions (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2006). It can thus be said that the use of GRI Labour Practices and 
Decent Work Disclosure items best represents the most internationally current 
stakeholder concerns on labour issues. 
 
The measurement techniques for the explanatory variables are based on past studies’ 
approaches (e.g. Hackston and Milne, 1996; Cahaya et al., 2008; Setyadi et al., 2007; 
Eng and Mak, 2003; Astami and Tower, 2006) and are summarized in Table I.  
 
[Take in Table I] 
 
Descriptive results 
Results of the descriptive statistics[14] for the explanatory variables are summarized in 
Table II. Leverage of IDX listed companies’ ranges from 0.5% to 400.58% with the mean 
of 58.12%. The high mean is consistent with Cahaya et al.’s (2008) results, supporting 
the argument that companies in Indonesia rely extensively on creditors’ funds. 
Interestingly, there is an increase in the independence of the board composition from 39% 
in 2005 to about 44% in 2007 (see Setyadi et al., 2007 for a comparison).  
 
[Take in Table II Here] 
 
For the control variables, it was found that total assets ranges widely from 566.67 million 
Rupiah to 319,085,590 million Rupiah with a mean of 10,017,110 million Rupiah[15]. 
The descriptive statistics reveals a relatively low mean of return on assets (ROA), which 
is 3.92%, with 9% of companies in the sample having a negative ROA. Nurhayati et al. 
(2006) argue that such a low ROA suggests that many Indonesian companies still suffer 
 
14 Before performing the statistical analysis, data were independently verified by two Indonesian accounting 
academics. The purpose of this verification is to ensure the accuracy of data. 
15 For illustrative purposes, 10,017 billion Rupiah equals to approximately 1,064 million Australian Dollars. This 
currency conversion is calculated based on the value of Rupiah against the Australian Dollar on 31 December 2007 
determined by the Indonesian central bank (see Bank Indonesia, 2009). 
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from the 1997 monetary crisis[16]. The results further show that the average age of the 
IDX listed company is 28 years old.  
 
Most IDX listed companies (91%) are fully privately owned while the other 9% are 
‘privatized’ government-owned companies[17]. 44.4% of sample companies are 
classified as high profile. It is also shown that 35.4% of sample companies operate 
internationally. This is consistent with Cahaya et al.’s (2008) finding that the frequency 
of internationally operating companies in Indonesia is lower than that of nationally 
operating companies. Finally, 52.9% of sample companies clearly communicate goals 
related to the sustainable value of their employees. 
 
The descriptive statistics of Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosure practices is 
reported in Table III. Analysis shows that 19 companies did not provide any voluntary 
Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosure items at all in their annual reports. The 
mean of labour disclosure level for all 223 sample companies is 17.7%. Thus, on average, 
IDX listed companies disclose about two voluntary labour disclosure items (out of 13 
items). This finding suggests that overall Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosure 
practices of Indonesian listed companies are low. 
 
[Take in Table III Here] 
 
Figure I presents the variation of disclosure levels across the 13 voluntary Labour 
Practices and Decent Work Disclosure items[18]. It can be seen from this figure that 
 
16 There appeared to be some recovery from the 1997 crises as evidenced by the increase in the average ROA of 
Indonesian listed companies from 2% in 2003 to 5.96% in 2004 (see Nurhayati et al., 2006; Cahaya et al., 2008). In 
2007, however, as shown in Table II, the average ROA dropped to 3.92%. This decline might be due to the weakening 
performance of finance industries in Indonesia during 2006 which still affects the financial performance of companies 
operating in those industries in 2007 (Daniel, 2007). 
17 To date, 37 government-owned enterprises in Indonesia have been privatized through the capital market. 
Commentators argue that this privatization is undertaken because of pressures from foreign investors and organizations 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Perampokan Harta Negara, 2008). They further 
posit that such a privatization negatively affects the welfare of Indonesian society as those companies’ assets partially 
become the property of foreigners (Perampokan Harta Negara, 2008). 
18 Although the third GRI Labour Practices and Decent Work indicator (LA3, Benefits provided to full- time 
employees) is excluded from this study, it is important to note that all 223 sample companies disclose this information 
in their annual reports. This shows IDX listed companies’ compliance with PSAK No. 24. This item is not included in 
Figure I as it is excluded from the disclosure index checklist of this study. 
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LA11, Programs for Skills Management and Lifelong Learning, is the most disclosed 
item (84.3%). This information is generally reported in the Human Resource 
Development section of the annual reports. The very high level of disclosure of LA11 
suggests that Indonesian companies see employee skill development programs as 
important for the sustainability of the companies’ operation. 
 
The second most disclosed item is LA13 Composition of Governance Bodies and 
Breakdown of Employees per Category according to Gender, Age group, Minority Group 
Membership, and Other Indicators of Diversity at 54.71%. Further analysis reveals that 
the diversity indicator, other than gender, age, and minority group disclosed by the 
sample companies, is the education level of the employees such as masters, bachelor 
degree, or senior high school graduates. This information is generally reported in the 
Human Resource Development section of the annual reports, indicating that IDX listed 
companies strive to best provide a comprehensive picture on their employee profile. 
 
[Take in Figure I] 
 
In contrast, LA6, Percentage of Total Workforce in Joint Health and Safety Committees, 
is the least disclosed item at a miniscule 0.45%. This is followed by LA9 Health and 
Safety Agreements with Trade Unions, and LA14 Salary of Men to Women both at 0.90%. 
One possible explanation for the very low disclosure level of LA6, Percentage of Total 
Workforce in Joint Health and Safety Committees, and LA9, Health and Safety 
Agreements with Trade Unions, is that Indonesian companies are still predominantly not 
including their workers in negotiations and important leadership such as health and safety 
committees (ILF, 2008). Therefore, non-disclosure of LA6 and LA9 might be the best 
way to hide such an exclusion from the eyes of the annual report readers. 
 
The very low disclosure level of items LA6 and LA9 also signals the weakness of labour 
unions in Indonesia as companies may not feel sufficiently pressured or influenced by 
unions to include their workers in formal health and safety joint committees and 
agreements. This is inconsistent with the arguments given by some scholars (see for 
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example Rawling, 2006a; 2006b) who generally posit that labour unions have 
considerable power to influence companies’ policies. It seems that, in this developing 
nation, labour unions such as SPSI (All Indonesian Labours’ Union) are less influential 
and may be used as one of many feedback sources for the government in determining 
regulations about the relationship between employers and workers[19]. Thus, on the 
surface, Indonesian labour unions may look powerful but may be weaker than they 
appear.  
 
There is an ongoing issue in relation to the salary of men to women. Under Act No. 
13/2003[20] (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2003), gender is not classified as one of the 
factors in formulating the structure and scales of wages. The act states that employers 
must give equal rights to male and female workers. However, in practice, female workers 
in Indonesia receive lower wages than male workers, particularly in manufacturing 
industries (Bennington and Habir, 2003). Gender may well be used by companies to 
determine the amount of wages for their workers and therefore they strategically choose 
to be less than transparent in disclosing information on compensation arrangements for 
LA14 Salary of Men to Women. 
 
Predictors of voluntary Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosures 
The six hypotheses were tested by using multiple regression techniques[21]. According to 
Coakes and Steed (2007), complete regression is appropriate for examining the 
association between the whole set of predictors and the dependent variable. The results of 
this regression are summarized in Table IV.  
 
19 In Indonesia, labour unions, which are represented by SPSI, look influential since they are involved in the issuance 
of many joint decrees such as Act No.3/1992 about the Workers’ Social Security Program with the Indonesian 
government (Tambunan and Purwoko, 2002). 
20 Act No. 13/2003 is the Indonesian government act which regulates manpower issues. 
21 Classical assumptions of multiple regression (multicollinearity, normality, linearity, outliers, and homoscedasticity 
(see Hair et al., 1998)) have been checked and it was found that the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity 
were not initially met. Data of key continuous variables were therefore transformed into natural logarithm. After this 
transformation, the normality assumption was met but heteroscedasticity still existed. According to Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2001), heteroscedasticity is not fatal to a multiple regression analysis therefore post-transformation-regression 
results are used as the hypotheses test in this study.  Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) further argue that, in a multiple 
regression, heteroscedasticity does not invalidate the results although it may weaken them. Importantly, if the normality 
assumption, which is the main regression assumption, is met as in this study, the relationship between variables can be 
considered homoscedastic (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). 
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[Take in Table IV] 
 
From Table IV, it can be seen that the regression model is highly significant (p-value 
0.000). The value of adjusted R-square is 0.384. The variation of voluntary labour 
disclosure practices is explained by the variation of two highly significant predictors. 
These are government ownership and international operations. Company size is also 
significant but at a moderate level. The coefficients of these three variables are positive, 
supporting the argument previously presented in this paper which posits that there are 
positive associations between voluntary Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosure 
practices and government ownership (Hypothesis 2), the presence of international 
operations (Hypothesis 4) and company size (control variable). The other hypothesized 
variables (leverage, industry type, explicit and clearly stated goal related to the 
sustainable value of employees, and independence of board) and the control variables 
(economic performance and age of business) were not found to be significant. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
In summary, whilst almost all of the sample companies (91.5%) communicated at least 
one item, there is an overall low level of labour disclosure practices (17.7%) by IDX 
listed companies. This leads to concerns about the level of under-reporting that is 
occurring in Indonesia in relation to labour and work practices. Such under-reporting 
might be a reflection of the lack of details in the legislation regarding CSR reporting.  
 
The results imply that Indonesian companies do not really see labour responsibility issues 
as a key precondition of CSR performance and reporting. This is evidenced by the low 
overall disclosure practices as well as the selective focusing on only a few particular 
items whilst ignoring other important items. Indonesian companies might be concealing 
some information to protect their image and reputation. Such practices thus signal that 
institutional pressures on labour disclosure in an Indonesian setting are low.   
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This study finds that leverage does not significantly influence the level of voluntary 
labour disclosure practices although, in Indonesia, creditors are influential.  This 
insignificant result is consistent with Cormier and Gordon (2001). This may imply that 
the coercive pressure of creditors on Indonesian companies does exist but not in terms of 
the provision of labour disclosure in the annual reports.  
 
An important finding of this study is the positively significant effect of government 
ownership on voluntary labour disclosure practices. This outcome is consistent with Firer 
and Williams (2005) and Eng and Mak (2003), showing that the coercive pressure of the 
Indonesian government on companies to disclose labour issues does exist. According to 
Adnan and Nankervis (2003), there is a strong influence by the government on 
government owned enterprises, including ‘privatized’ government-owned companies, 
because most members of the board of directors in such companies are high ranking 
government officials. This finding implies that the Indonesian government is striving to 
deal seriously with CSR matters by at least compelling companies through its officials 
sitting on those companies’ boards to perform and communicate good CSR activities. 
 
Industry type variable is found to be statistically insignificant. There is uniformity of 
labour communication across high and low industry groupings. This finding is consistent 
with Brown et al., (2005) and Cahaya et al., (2008). This insignificant association is 
possibly explained by the argument that mimetic isomorphism copying practices may 
occur in a more specific industry classification such as within each of the nine IDX 
classifications (e.g. agriculture, mining, basic industry and chemicals).  
 
The presence of international operations is significant in a positive direction. This is 
consistent with Cahaya et al. (2008) and supports Hypothesis 4 that companies with 
international operations provide more voluntary labour disclosure practices. One 
explanation for this positive relationship is that Indonesian companies’ overseas 
competitors are socially responsible to their employees and disclose any actions 
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regarding this responsibility in their annual reports[22]. In line with the mimetic 
isomorphism of institutional theory, to compete with foreign competitors, Indonesian 
companies then copy their labour reporting practices. This finding therefore implies that 
companies in Indonesia need to seriously consider undertaking good social responsibility 
to their employees and disclose this responsibility in their annual reports to better survive 
in a global market. 
 
The explicit communication of a goal related to the sustainable value of employees is not 
a significant predictor of voluntary labour disclosure practices. This is at odds with the 
study by Amran and Devi (2007). One reason may be a problem of categorization, given 
the stakeholder groups mentioned in the stated goal are not always specifically focused 
on employees. Instead the stated overarching goal may be used as a symbol to project a 
good image to annual report readers.  
 
The independent composition of board is not a significant predictor of voluntary labour 
disclosure practices, a finding which is consistent with a number of previous disclosure 
studies such as Nurhayati et al., (2006). The lack of supervision effectiveness of 
Indonesian commissioners might best explain this finding (World Bank, 2005).  
 
Only one control variable, which is company size, is statistically significant but at a 
moderate level. One possible explanation is that bigger companies interact with a greater 
number of stakeholders (see Cahaya et al., 2008) with interests in different labour issues. 
To satisfy these interests, the companies perform a number of different labour related 
CSR activities and disclose these activities in their annual reports, resulting in a higher 
level of labour disclosure. As such, bigger companies in Indonesia more explicitly 
manage the relationship with their stakeholders through the implementation of good 
labour related CSR activities. 
 
 
22 The social responsibility activities may include the application of SA8000 (refer theoretical framework section of 
this paper). 
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Overall, Indonesian listed companies voluntarily provide a low level of labour practices 
and decent work information. This is concerning given the new regulatory changes 
introduced into Indonesia for all listed companies to report social responsibility activities 
in their annual reports (see BAPEPAM, 2006). This study finds that the variability of 
Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosures is partially explained by isomorphic 
institutional theory, particularly by its coercive and mimetic variants. This study thus 
provides important contributions to the literature by offering additional knowledge 
regarding the positively significant impacts of government ownership, international 
operations and company size on the level of labour disclosure practices in this developing 
nation. 
 
The lack of disclosure may also be explained by the lack of specific details provided in 
the Indonesian legislation or by a lag affect in implementing the requirements, with both 
aspects being recommended for future research. Additionally, it may be explained by the 
lack of effective enforcement by the government.  As indicated in the literature, the 
regulatory enforcement in Indonesia is weak (see Bennington and Habir, 2003; Setyadi et 
al., 2007). This therefore raises questions: Are the Indonesian government and their 
securities regulator BAPEPAM serious in regulating CSR issues? Are they choosing 
strategic inaction with the regulations so that their CSR regulatory practices look good in 
front of the eyes of international audiences? Or, do they lack a good understanding of 
CSR practices which has resulted in unclear regulation lacking details? These questions 
are all areas that need further exploration. 
 
As with most research, this study has limitations. Firstly, only companies having a direct 
government ownership is considered as those having a proportion of government 
ownership. This is because Indonesian listed companies usually do not clearly disclose 
whether or not they indirectly belong to the government through government-owned 
enterprises in their annual reports. The direct ownership itself is arguably appropriate 
since it clearly reflects direct control and pressure of the government on companies 
through their representatives in the board of directors to undertake particular practices 
(Amran and Devi, 2008). Secondly, only two influential stakeholder groups, creditors and 
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the government, are addressed in the hypotheses. Other influential stakeholder groups 
such as ‘interest groups’ are also potentially able to pressure companies to disclose labour 
information. Future research including other independent variables such as media 
exposure[23] could be undertaken particularly to provide more insights into the Labour 
Practices and Decent Work Disclosure practices in this developing country. 
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Appendix. The 2006 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) labour practices and decent 
work indicators 
 
Category GRI 
code 
Indicatora 
A.1.  Employment a LA1 Total workforce by employment type, employment contract, and region. 
LA2 Total number and rate of employee turnover by age group, gender, and 
region. 
 
LA3b Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not provided to temporary 
or part-time employees, by major operations. 
A.2. Labor/Management      
Relations 
LA4 Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
LA5 Minimum notice period(s) regarding operational changes, including whether 
it is specified in collective agreements. 
 
A.3. Occupational 
Health and Safety 
LA6 
 
Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint management–
worker health and safety committees that help monitor and advise on 
occupational health and safety programs. 
 
LA7 Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and absenteeism, and 
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number of work related fatalities by region. 
 
LA8 Education, training, counseling, prevention, and risk-control programs in 
place to assist workforce members, their families, or community members 
regarding serious diseases.  
 
LA9 Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade unions. 
 
A.4. Training and 
Education 
LA10 Average hours of training per year per employee by employee category. 
  
LA11 Programs for skills management and lifelong learning that support the 
continued employability of employees and assist them in managing career 
endings. 
 
LA12 Percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career 
development reviews. 
 
A.5. Diversity and 
Equal Opportunity 
LA13 Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of employees per 
category according to gender, age group, minority group membership, and 
other indicators of diversity. 
 
LA14 Ratio of basic salary of men to women by employee category 
 
Source: Global Reporting Initiative (2006).  
a) If an indicator has several subparts, a score of 1 will be awarded when any of the subparts is disclosed. This is due 
to the possible scarcity of information within the annual report. In LA1, for example, a score of 1 will be awarded if 
the company discloses any of the three subparts: total workforce by employment type, employment contract or region 
b) LA3 is excluded from the disclosure index checklist of this study because, under PSAK No. 24, this item is 
considered as a mandatory item (see IAI, 2007). Accordingly, in the main statistical analysis, only thirteen items are 
used to measure Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosure practices. 
 
 
Table I Measurement technique of the independent and control variables 
Source: Original table 
a Consistent with Nurhayati (2005), IDX’s official industry classification, which consists of nine industries, is 
reclassified into the high-low coding. Seven industries namely agriculture, mining, basic industry and chemicals, 
miscellaneous industry, consumer goods industry, property and real estate, and infrastructure, utilities and 
Isomorphic 
process 
Independent 
variables 
Control 
variables 
Measurement Type of data 
Coercive 
isomorphism  
Leverage  Total liabilities divided by total assets Continuous 
Government 
ownership 
 1 = there is a proportion of government ownership        
0 = otherwise 
Categorical 
Mimetic 
isomorphism 
Industry type a 
 
 1 = high profile industry 
0 = low profile industry 
Categorical 
International 
operations 
 1 =Yes-Have material foreign sales or a foreign  
      subsidiary or a foreign branch office 
0 = No material foreign sales, foreign subsidiaries  
      or foreign branch offices 
Categorical 
Normative 
isomorphism 
Explicit and clearly 
stated  goal related 
to the sustainable 
value of employees 
 1 = the company has clearly communicated   
       goals/missions related to sustainable value of its  
       employees 
0 = otherwise 
Categorical 
Independence of 
board 
 Percentage of independent commissioners in the board Continuous 
  Company sizeb Log of total assets Continuous 
  Economic 
performance 
Return on Assets (ROA) : 2 year average Continuous 
  Age of business Number of years from inception  Continuous 
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transportation are classified as high profile industries whereas the other two, finance and trade, services and investment, 
are classified as low profile industries. 
b Company size was initially measured by total assets but finally logged to reduce skewness (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001). 
 
Table II Descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
Variable Measurement Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Leverage Total liabilities 
divided by total 
assets (in %) 
0.5 400.58 58.12 56.95 37.07 
Composition 
of board 
Percentage of 
independent 
commissioners 
in the board 
20 100 43.55 40 13.41 
Company 
size 
Total assets (in 
million Rupiah) 
566.67 319,085,590.00 10,017,110.00 
 
1,349,719.00 33,298,746.44 
Economic 
performance 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) – 2 year 
average (in %) 
-200.2 42.02 3.92 2.91 15.68 
Age of 
business 
Number of years 
from inception 
3 148 28 24 19 
 
Panel B: Categorical variables 
Variable Measurement   Frequency Percentage 
Government 
ownership 
1 = there is a proportion of government ownership 
 
  
 20 9.0 
 0 = otherwise   203 91.0 
Industry type 1 = high profile industry     99 44.4 
 0 = low profile industry   124 55.6 
International 
operations 
1 =Yes-Have foreign sales or a foreign subsidiary or a  
      foreign branch office 
  
  79 35.4 
 0 = No foreign sales, foreign subsidiaries  or  foreign  
       Branch  offices 
  
144 64.6 
Explicit and 
clearly stated  
goal related to 
the sustainable 
value of 
employees 
1 = the company has goals/missions  related  to   
      sustainable   value of its  employees 
 
  
118 52.9 
 0 = otherwise   105 47.1 
Source: Original table 
 
Table III Descriptive statistics of voluntary Labour Practices and Decent Work 
Disclosure (LPDWD) practices 
Dependent variable Minimum 
(%) 
Maximum 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
Standard 
deviation (%) 
LPDWD index (%) of 
all 223 companies 
0 92.31 17.7 15.38 11.56 
LPDWD index (%) of 
204 disclosing 
companies 
7.69 92.31 19.38 15.38 10.67 
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Source: Original table 
 
Table IV Results of multiple regression  
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient P-value 
(Constant)            -0.02  0.792 
Leverage +  -0.001  0.933       
Government ownership +  0.075        0.000*** 
Industry type +  0.003  0.786 
International operations +  0.083        0.000*** 
Explicit and clearly stated  goal related to the 
sustainable value of employees 
+  0.007  0.469 
Independence of board +  0.002  0.908 
Company size (control variable) +  0.006    0.052* 
Economic performance (control variable) +  0.036  0.613 
Age of business (control variable) +  0.005  0.593 
Model summary 
Adjusted R-Square  0.384 
Standard Error of the Estimate      0.07374 
Regression Model (Sig.)        0.000*** 
Source: Original table 
***significant at 1% level 
**significant at 5% level 
*significant at 10% level
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Figure I The 13 items of voluntary Labour Practices and Decent Work Disclosures (LPDWD) 
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Source: Original figure 
 
